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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20575

vs.
ONE 1983 PONTIAC, (JOE ARAVE),
Defendant/Respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State of Utah sought a forfeiture of a 1983 Pontiac on
the basis that it had been used in the transportation of
narcotics, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13, 1953 (as
amended).

The District Court denied that forfeiture. Whether

the lower court abused it's discretion in disallowing the
forfeiture of the vehicle.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The lower court heard argument and evidence on the State's
petition.

In a memorandum decision dated February 14, 1985, the

Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, District Court Judge, ruled that
the vehicle should not be forfeited.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent desires that the lower court's decision be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In August of 1984, Joe Arave was the owner of a 1983 black
Pontiac Firebird automobile, whose value was approximately
$10,000.

On two occasions, in August and September of 1984,
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Arave was approached by undercover narcotics officers.

These

officers had befriended Arave who was using cocaine and he gave
them a small quantity thinking they were his friends.
20-25)

(T.p.

There was evidence that any profit motive was involved

and it was questionable whether the cocaine was for sale or
merely possession for Mr. Arave's own use and for the use of
someone that he thought was his friend.

(See Record on Appeal,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.)
The State filed a complaint for forfeiture pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated §58-37-13 on September 20, 1984, and an answer to
said complaint was filed on October 18, 1984.
set for a hearing until February 8, 1985.

The matter was not

The hearing on the

forfeiture was held before any criminal trial resulting in a
conviction or plea of guilty in the criminal case which arose
from the alleged sale of cocaine.

(See Record on Appeal)

The hearing included testimony from the two undercover narcotics
officers, Scott Crawford and Fred Olson, and Joe Arave.
Uncontroverted evidence was also received, that Arave had taken a
loan at Zion's First National Bank to repair and rebuild the 1983
Pontiac.

Although the bank did not take a security interest

therein, Mr. Arave was indebted to the bank pursuant to an
agreement where they would loan him the money to rebuild various
vehicles which he would then sell and repay loans.
his standard business practice.

This has been

(T.p.30-48)

Joe Arave's father made a down payment of $1,900 when the
car was first purchased for repair and claimed an equitable lien
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thereon.

Following the receipt of testimony, the Honorable VeNoy

Christofferson entered his memorandum decision in which he found
that under the totality of circumstances the forfeiture of this
vehicle would be disproportionate to the actual activity which
took place.

The court took four things into consideration:

the

jurisdictional problem, the use of the car, the equitable
interest by either the father or the bank, and also the question
of penalty, and determined that this was not a situation that
that Legislature had in mind to discourage the illegal
transportation of contraband.

(See memorandum decision page 3)

The court ruled that the car would not -be forfeited.

The state

appealed from that decision.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Decisions of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal
unless totally unsupported by facts or clearly arbitrary arid
capricious.

The trial court's ruling in this case is both

supported by the facts and the law as it is presently constituted
in the State of Utah and was not arbitrary and capricious and,
therefore, should be sustained on appeal.
ARGUMENT
It is important for this Court to note that the forfeiture
sections, §58-37-1 et seq, and §58-36-1 et seq, have been on the
books for sometime.

The law has not been legislatively altered

or amended since 1971.

This Court has reviewed the statute in

only one case, State of Utah v. One Porsche Two Door, ID number
9112111026, title number PP1Q026F, bearing Kansas license plate
number JOR1652, 522 P.2d 917 (1974).

In that case, Justice
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Henroidf in his own inimitable style, attempted to discern the
legislative intent in adopting the statute.

In that case, the

facts clearer than they are in the instant case.

The only

evidence against the respondent was that he was in his vehicle
using a controlled substance.

There was no evidence that he

intended to transport it for sale other than the fact that he was
using it in the car while the car was moving.

The Court held

that in this type of situation, the statute did not intend to
provide the ultimate penalty of forfeiture.
The State, in it's brief, seems to suggest that had the
instant case been before Judge Henroid, he would have found that
it was the type of case in which the Legislature intended
forfeiture.

Respondent takes issue with that proposition.

It is

important to read the actual language of the Porsche case to get
the real flavor of what Judge Henroid was saying, to-wit:

"This

section, referring to the forfeiture, as applied to this case
leads to an unusually harsh result, constituting an additional
fine or penalty in connection with the misdemeanor.

This whole

case leads to an unconscionable forfeiture and that the trial
court was correct in concluding that the enormity of the
forfeiture hardly fit the $299 misdemeanors".

Id. at 918

"That

forfeitures are frowned upon needs no citation of but few
authorities,

since the cases supporting such an elementary

principle are legion...
(Quoting from Moran v. Knights), it matters not whether the
action is one of equity or one of law.
prevail.

The rules of equity must

It is no answer for appellant to urge the court's
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interpretation of the statute was erroneous (as the State is
alleging here) as the decision of the court is supported by good
and sufficient reason or'reasons.

Id at 918

"The statute can

obviously can lead to the most absurd results a reason this Court
consistently is pointed up as a valid reason for invalidation of
a statute or refusal to apply it under particular facts, making
such application ridiculous."

Id at 919

It is clear that in the instant case Judge Christofferson
had read the Porsche decision and, in fact, found from the
totality of the circumtances the same kinds of difficulties that
Justice Henroid found in that case.

It is clear that the court

believed this to be an unconscionable forfeiture for a variety of
reasons, one of which the State did not even address in it's
brief, the jurisdictional question of whether the State met the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated §58-36-13, 1953, which
requires a hearing within twenty (20) days of the filing of an
answer to the State's Complaint for forfeiture.
In this case, an answer was timely filed on October 18,
1984, and through no fault or negligence of the respondent, the
hearing was not held until February 8, 1985, substantially beyond
the twenty day period.

Although the court did not enforce a

jurisdictional bar to the case, it did find that there was
non-compliance by the State and the court with that paragraph.
Secondly, the court found that in effect it was questionable
whether the activities described by the undercover agents in this
case were a sale for profit but was only possession by the
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respondent, on his own, of a controlled substance and possession
to turn it over to someone he thought was his friend.

Thirdly,

the court found that there was a question of an equitable
interest in the car by others other than Mr. Arave, who was the
owner.

The court made reference to the guarantee and down

payment by the respondent's father and the business relationship
that the respondent had with the Bank in terms of rebuilding
cars, making loans, selling the cars and paying the loans off as
factor which had to be weighed in light of the over-all necessity
to forfeit.
The court also found that the quantity of the substance,
and the extent to which the car had been utilized in the
transportation of that substance, was disproportionate to the
$10/000.00 value of the vehicle.

In fact, it is interesting that

the Judge's opening comments in his Memorandum Decision are
similar to the entire tenor of those made by Justice Henroid,
eleven (11) years earlier in the Porsche case, when he says "It
sometimes seems a little bit odd that generally the cars
involved, as far as the State seeking a forfeiture, involve
$10,000.00 Pontiac's or Porsche's and $15,000.00 Trans Ams, but
no $250.00 1970 Chevy's."
The respondent believes that the court by this somewhat
tongue-in-cheek statement, has validated Justice Henroid's
earlier comments.

No forfeiture statute is inviolate and

the

trial court, as a court of equity, must look at the entire
totality of the circumstances to determine if the forfeiture is
warranted.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court in this case, found that there were a number of
factors, which made forfeiture, an unconscionable act.
The respondent agrees with the citation of the case State v.
Chambers, 533 P.2d 586 (1975) as the basic standard for review in
this case.

If discretion is reasonably used and is not shown to

have been abused or arbitrary or capricious, then judgment of the
trial court should not be disturbed.
The state argues basically four (4) points in support of its
position that the Judge's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The first is whether or not Arave 1 s action constituted
distribution or mere possession.

Respondent concedes that there

was some evidence that the car was used by Arave while possessing
cocaine and at various times, Arave transferred that cocaine to
an individual who he thought was his friend.

The state seems to

suggest that the statute is a per-se statute, to-wit: That if in
fact the state makes out a case for distribution by the use of
the vehicle, that no other evidence needs to be considered and
the vehicle would be forfeited.

Under Justice Henroid's language

in the Porsche case however, this case is still a case of equity
and the court can consider other factors, even if it found there
was a distribution to determine whether or not forfeiture would
still be allowed.

In addition, the Judge in effect, found that

the evidence was not clear as to whether this was a straight
distribution or mere possession for ones own use, similar to the
circumstances in the Porsche case.

As such, the state did not

sustain its burden in this particular instance and the court was
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justified in using this as one of the reasons for disallowing
forfeiture.
With respect to the statefs claim that the amount of
controlled substance makes no difference, certainly it made some
difference to Justice Henroid in the Porsche case when he
commented on the small amount of value of substance versus the
worth of the vehicle.
it was even discussed.

If in fact it made no difference, why was
Again, the state fails to look at this

statute as one which must be examined in the light of equity and
if that is done, then these considerations are valid.
The state further argues that neither the father or Zion's
First National Bank had an equitable interest.

It is clear that

the Bank had a relationship with Joe Arave, in which he would
borrow money to rebuild vehicle then sell them to repay the
loans.

It is true that in this specific instance, the state did

not have a specific lien against the vehicle for a loan, but it
is also true that the evidence is clear that money was borrowed
for the purpose of rebuilding this vehicle and the only way Arave
had to repay the money to the Bank, was by selling the vehicle.
In addition, the father had paid a down payment on the
vehicle and had an equitable interest in the property.

The fact

is, the real victims in a forfeiture of this vehicle would be the
Bank and the father, at least from the evidence presented,
because Arave would not have the ability to repay the loan or
repay the money owed to his father.
The state for some reason, cites §58-37-13 (1) (e) (iii) , as
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dispositive of the fact that Mr. Arave's father did not have an
interest in the vehicle by saying that there was no evidence that
Joe Arave's father could have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place in use of
the conveyance. This is the specific language which would bring
him within the statute and would not allow him to maintain his
lien.

The record is void of any evidence that the father, or for

that matter, the Bank knew that any violation which involved the
use of the vehicle was taking place and therefore, arguably, he
falls within the statute and therefore, the vehicle could not be
forfeited under that provision.

The Judge obviously considered

this in making his decision.
The State's last point concerns whether or not the value of
the vehicle should have any bearing on the decision.

Certainly

in a manner of equity, the value of the vehicle has some bearing
on the ultimate disposition.

The state again, refuses to

apply principles of equity to this statute, which this Court has
very clearly, said must be done.

The value of the vehicle versus

the value of the substance used and the value of the transaction
in a court of equity certainly has some bearing on the ultimate
decision.
What is important here, is that the trial court did not
stress one of these factors as being predominant but, that a
combination of all of the factors present in this case, satisfied
the court the forfeiture was not appropriate.

This is certainly

a sustainable decision under the presently existing
interpretation of the statute set forth in the Porsche case.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits Utah Code Annotated
§58-37 et seq/. is a statute which must be viewed in equitable
term.

The trial court in viewing the matter as one of equity and

taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, did
not abuse its discretion by failing to forfeit the vehicle.

The

state has not sustained it burden on appeal by showing abuse of
that discretion and therefore, the decision of the lower court
should be affirmed.
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